A Game of Ethnic Musical Chairs? Immigrant Businesses and the Alleged Formation and Succession of Niches in the Amsterdam Economy

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Introduction

For years, Amsterdam has been a place of settlement for large groups of immigrants. In the sixteenth century residents from the South Netherlands arrived. They could no longer bear to live under the yoke of the Spanish fury and fled to the Calvinist North (Lucassen and Penninx 1994: 30 ff.). In the seventeenth century a new flood of Protestant refugees arrived: the Huguenots. Both groups, immigrants from the South Netherlands and the Huguenots, were in possession of plenty of capital, trading contacts and skills, which enabled them to secure a prominent place in the Amsterdam economy. This was especially so for the first group of refugees who were specialised in trade and industry, and were given certain privileges such as (free) civil rights and generous fiscal benefits by the city administration. Partly due to their energetic entrepreneurship, the city of Amsterdam – and with it the Republic – became one focus of what was then the world economy. Significant in this regard is the fact that roughly one-third of the money invested in the Dutch East India Company came from immigrants from the South Netherlands.

There were of course other groups of immigrants. From the end of the sixteenth century on, large groups of Sephardic Jews from the Iberian peninsula arrived in Mokum,
and, in later periods – up until this century – also Ashkenazic Jews from Central and East Europe. These immigrants became involved with trade and industry – partly due to the fact that the non-Jewish majority excluded them from various occupations (Berg, Wijsenbeek and Fischer 1994). The Jewish economic activities were concentrated around certain branches of industry, such as banking, the sugar and the butcher’s trade. At the end of the nineteenth, beginning of the twentieth century – that is, during the period that the industrial economy developed further and the foundations of the welfare state were being laid – they were well represented in Amsterdam in the free professions (among others, amusement), in banking, insurance and the retail trade, as well as in the production of ready-to-wear clothing, tobacco processing and the cutting and polishing of diamonds (Leydesdorff 1987; Lucassen 1994). They further monopolised the market for kosher products, whilst the local traders in the Jewish quarters were to a certain extent protected from the ‘open’ market. Finally, a considerable proportion of Jews earned an income by irregular homeworking – this was widespread in the garment industry – and with small-scale street trading. The Jewish street-traders were over-represented in the vegetable and fruit trade, in the fish and flower trade and to a lesser degree as ice sellers. During the interbellum period, one out of every three Amsterdam street-traders was of Jewish origin; at one point their share in the rag-and-bone trade was ninety per cent!

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Roman Catholic immigrants of West-Phalian origin settled in the city. Anton Sinkel was one of the first to experiment with a ‘modern’ shop-concept. The descendants from the German peddlers, Clemens and August Brenninkmeijer, followed in his footsteps. Although the first department store of C & A was situated in the northern town of Sneek, the chain first became really successful in Amsterdam. There, at the turn of the century, a number of sales outlets were set up as well as the first factory for garment manufacture. The retailers Willem Vroom and Anton Dreesmann also established their first manufacturing business in Amsterdam. They, and many other immigrants with a Roman Catholic, German background were able to penetrate into the Dutch c.q. Amsterdam garment manufacturing industry using their trading skills and their knowledge of textiles (Miellet 1987).

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2 In the beginning they were excluded from most of the Guilds. Yet, the Chirurgeon, Estate agent and Bookseller Guilds allowed Jews to become members – under strict conditions – even before the Batavian Republic (Kockelkorn 1994; Lucassen 1994). Furthermore, the exclusion from the (other) guilds in the Republic was far less extensive than in some of the other neighbouring countries, see Lucassen 1997.
So much is clear: these immigrants, or at least a number of them, originating from different corners of the world, arrived in different historical eras each with their own ethnic and religious backgrounds, concentrated themselves as entrepreneurs in certain branches of trade and industry. Other examples of such concentrations are those of the Belgian straw hat makers; the German bakers; the German beer brewers; the Oldenburg plasterers, white-washers and masons; the French umbrella peddlers or the Italian street-traders selling plaster of Paris statues, terrazzo workers, chimney sweepers and ice-cream makers (Schrover 1996; Bovenkerk and Ruland 1992). Although all these examples suggest that economic concentrations only occurred with tradesmen and craftsmen, the case of German servants illustrates that this could also apply to hired labourers (Henkes 1995).

That immigrants should funnel to certain occupations or branches of industry is intriguing. Such niches are not confined to history books. To this day such concentrations can be observed in various forms. Walking through the city one is likely to pass an Italian ice-cream seller or a Turkish or Moroccan Islamic butcher, or bump into a clothes rack of a Turkish sweatshop. With a bit of imagination we could even claim that they are the successors of the Jewish ice-cream sellers, kosher butchers and confectionairs who determined the townscape before the war.

But does the process of economic incorporation really does take place through concentrations in certain occupations or lines of business? And, if this is the case, does a pattern of succession really occur? If so, what are the structural determinants? The answer to these questions could help us in obtaining greater insight in the dynamic process of economic incorporation in which the immigrants of today participate. The immigrant self-employment in Amsterdam has been researched here and there, but the question of the succession of ethnic niches has not been systematically dealt with until now. This paper is therefore to be seen, first and foremost, as an intellectual exercise. I use the theoretical insights of the American sociologist Roger Waldinger as source of inspiration, and shall conclude by providing some commentary on his work.

**A Game of Ethnic Musical Chairs**
Waldinger (1996) described the process of succession of ethnic niches expressively as ‘a game of ethnic musical chairs’. In his cleverly written book on New York – as well as in his contribution to the prize-winning book on Los Angeles (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996) – he deals with the question of why the various categories of the population have taken up certain positions in the urban economy, and asks in particular, which structural determinants have triggered this process and kept it in motion. In contemporary literature emphasis is placed on the economic and demographic transformations that metropoles such as New York, London and Los Angeles are going through and which, in turn, cause a mismatch of labour (compare Kasarda, Friedrichs and Ehlers 1992). Other, scholars emphasise the process of globalisation and point to the concentration of high-grade service activities in so-called global cities which directly or indirectly create a demand for small-scale and party low-quality activities (Sassen 1988 and 1991). Waldinger is not enamoured with these approaches. In his opinion, they lack adequate empirical foundations (certainly in the case of New York and Los Angeles), they are economically deterministic and ahistorical and do not take enough account of the real *dramatis personae*, the immigrants themselves.

Waldinger claims that in every market economy jobs are distributed according to the principles of desirability and availability, yet each market economy is affected by the social structure of the country within which it is embedded. In a society as ‘race-conscious’ as the United States, people in the ‘free’ market economy are ranked in terms of ethnic or racial characteristics. In this way a *queue* is formed, a pecking order, with the members of the dominant cultural group at the head and the problematised groups somewhere towards the end. Immigrants coming into such a structure, and whose economic orientation is still influenced by the land of origin, will, more often than not, be satisfied with this marginal position. However, changes in the economy affect the queue. Due to the vertical or horizontal mobility of, particularly, the better situated, vacancies are created in the lower levels of the queue. These in turn are filled by those lower positioned or by newcomers. These processes take years, sometimes developing quickly, sometimes slowly. This knowledge forces us to drop our all too popular preoccupation with short-term developments and enables us to go beyond worrying about the issues of the day.

How are niches formed? Waldinger (1996: 95; see also Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996: 476-477) operationalises a niche – partly on the basis of the work of Model (1993) – as:

‘(...) an industry, employing at least one thousand people, in which a group’s representation is a least 150 percent of its share of total employment’.4

This definition is not limited to trade and industry but includes also the public sector: the government influences niche formation, not only as an agent which can strengthen or, weaken them, but also by influencing their location – for example by employing members of a certain ethnic group in the public sector. Niches develop in the interaction between the group and its surrounding society, in which the embeddedness in social networks is of crucial importance. Lieberson (1980: 379) points out that:

‘(...) it is clear that most racial and ethnic groups tend to develop concentrations in certain jobs which either reflect some distinctive cultural characteristics, special skills initially held by some members, or the opportunity structures at the time of their arrival. (...) These concentrations are partially based on networks or ethnic contacts and experiences that in turn direct other compatriots in these directions.’

Waldinger uses this line of thought and suggests that immigrants are funnelled towards specialised economic activities, via their networks; the most important instruments being enforceable trust and bounded solidarity to one’s own group (compare Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Roberts 1994). As soon as the first pioneers have established themselves, others follow and thus, in time, ethnic concentrations – or niches – are formed. As usual, the most attractive functions are reserved for insiders, while the outsiders at the end of the queue (for example, members of other immigrant groups) are excluded (Waldinger 1995). This continues as long as there is space in the market (Light 1998) or until vacancies occur elsewhere, enabling a group as a whole to shift to another line of business. The latter may be caused by the niche itself: once a concentration of

4 I would like to point out that I am concerned here with niches, not with the seemingly related concept of the ethnic enclave (compare Wilson and Portes 1980). The concentration of ethnic groups in a certain trade or line of business is determined by dividing the share of a certain group in employment in a certain industry by its share in the total employment.
entrepreneurs from a certain immigrant group grows, the demand for accountants, lawyers, carriers and so on, from the same group increases at the same time.

The most important ingredients in Waldinger’s recipe are, to summarise in short, a the permanent striving of all participants in economic life for social mobility; a continuous stream of new immigrants; a race-conscious society; restricted embeddedness in social networks; the formation of a labour queue with in-groups at the top and out-groups at the bottom; the formation of ethnic concentrations (niches) in certain occupations or branches of industry; an institutional framework formed by ethnic or racially based interest group activity; a high level of continuity of market conditions and of ethnic loyalty. Together these form the mixture from which the pattern of succession of ethnic niches develops.

To what extent does this viewpoint – with its empirical foundations on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean – give us something to build on. True, Waldinger did not develop it with the intention to understand and explain the situation in Amsterdam. Yet, it is justified to assess the validity of his theoretical argument. There are, beforehand, a few complications. Firstly, a consequent use of Waldinger’s definition of niches can lead to peculiar situations. Are we to consider the massive employment of tens of thousands of guest workers in ageing industries in the 1960s as niches, even if they had, as job-hunters, no influence on the branch of industry in which they eventually landed? And what about slavery? A strict application of Waldinger’s definition could possibly justify statements indicating that African slaves on the American cotton, or the Surinamese sugar plantations, formed a niche. Such statements seem to me rather strange.

Secondly, Waldinger refers to occupations and branches of trade and industry in rather general terms. Because of this, he is danger of missing important differentiations. A particular group may have formed a niche in the health care sector, for example; for their economic incorporation, there is a great difference between being spread over the sector as a whole or concentrated in the positions of heart surgeon, nurse, or domestic help. These are, after all, different labour markets.

Thirdly, only when the number of people in a particular occupation or branch of industry exceed the thousand does Waldinger consider these concentrations of economic activities to fall under the definition of niche. For only then does the concentration have any impact on the group as a whole. In the case of Amsterdam this would mean that the 14 Greek cafes and restaurants, for example, would have absolutely no impact on the
local Greek ‘community’ which counted then roughly 250 people (Vermeulen et al. 1985: 57 and 114). This is hardly credible. I can think of no compelling theoretical reason to employ the mega-scale used in the United States on cases such as Amsterdam.

Fourthly, Waldinger assumes a long historic period in which there is continuous immigration and strong social continuity. These are to a certain extent necessary conditions for the game of ethnic musical chairs. However, in the Netherlands these conditions are only partially fulfilled. There is absolutely no question of continuous immigration, and the Second World War was an important breaking point in this respect, clearly affecting the continuity of entrepreneurship. During the occupation, the Nazis destroyed the Jewish niches, making any eventual niche maintenance impossible. For this reason, in the rest of this paper, when using examples from the past, I will focus mostly on the post-war period. Whether this period is long enough to allow the niches to become mature remains to be seen.

Taking these restrictions into account, I return from what was New Amsterdam, to the would-be global city in the Low Lands.

**Niches in Amsterdam**

Amsterdam, just as New York, has always had a strong influx of immigrants. At present, almost at the end of the second millennium, the Dutch capital has, both absolutely and relatively, the greatest number of immigrants. Immigrant share in the total population of the city (irrespective of nationality and including those born in the Netherlands) amounts to 42 per cent.

<< Table 1 about here >>

The greatest part of the labour force of these groups has become incorporated in the urban economy through employment as waged labourers. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Chinese, who are well known for their entrepreneurship, came to Amsterdam in 1911 as hired seamen (van Heek 1936). They were recruited to replace
striking boilermen and coal trimmers. As blacklegs they stood way back in the labour queue – to use Waldinger’s terminology. A similar position was later held by the guest workers from Italy, Spain, Turkey and Morocco. During the 1950s and 1960s, due to economic expansion, native Dutch labourers, with low levels of education who were working in malfunctioning industries, found employment in higher ranks of their own branch of industry or in branches with better prospects. The vacant places were filled by migrant workers who, being economically oriented towards their land of origin, saw little chance of obtaining – by Dutch standards – more attractive jobs (Marshall-Goldschwartz 1973; Penninx and van Velzen 1977). The government was most supportive of such recruiting practices. In Amsterdam, the guest workers were hired in the factories of, for example, Ford or the off-shore firm ADM.

Between 1956 and 1963, industries also recruited in Surinam (Dutch Guyana) and the Dutch Antilles. The experiences with these labourers were, however, ‘not so positive’ and new recruits were not sought (Penninx 1979: 50; see also van Amersfoort 1973: 163-164 and 182-186). The slow work tempo, the high level of absenteeism and the lack of work-experience made the Ford factory wary of hiring more Surinamese – something which seems to prove the existence of a queue (Bayer 1965: 64). On the other hand, Surinamese workers at the ADM accused their employers of not keeping to their agreements and complained about the salary and the housing (Schuster 1998). A considerable number of the present immigrants, however, arrived during later periods, that is periods of economic recession. The two immigration peaks from Surinam for example, fell unfortunately in the same period as the two oil crises in the 1970s, thus hampering their economic incorporation.

During the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, the position of immigrants in the Amsterdam labour market declined considerably – as was the case in the rest of the country. Since then, immigrants are more often and longer unemployed than the native Dutch, and, if they do have work it is often in the less attractive areas of the labour market. The labour force classification of 1995 shows that, on average, 14 per cent of the urban population was without a paid job. The differences between the different population categories are marked.

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5 This of course is also the case for other countries on the European continent. Morokvasic, Phizacklea and Rudolf (1986) contribute the absence of immigrant-run sewing workshops in Germany partly to the persecution of the Jews.

6 Admittedly, those with restaurants nowadays have little in common with the labourers of the past. The Chinese form in many ways a rather heterogenous group, see Benton and Vermeulen 1987.
Those Amsterdammers with jobs work mainly in the service sector, in particular in health care, social work, and in banks, insurance companies and other commercial service sectors. Surinamese and Antilleans fit in with the general profile. Turks and Moroccans are almost non-existent in the commercial service sector, working mainly in industry in general, in trade and in the catering industry in particular. This pattern is not only explained by their lack of qualifications, but also by discrimination and the fact that their economically relevant networks barely reach outside these sectors (compare Veenman 1994: 98). The fact that the economy in Amsterdam is increasingly heavily dependent on the service sector (Amsterdam Municipal Council 1996), does not make it easier for the Turks and Moroccans to quit their positions at the end of the queue.

In the Dutch welfare state, the government, and in its wake, numerous organisations and institutions in the private sector, have made efforts to turn the tide. Due especially to inventive forms of flexible work – such as part-time work, temporary work, and temporary contracts – and moderate wage increases, the employment levels after 1985 increased considerably (SCP 1996; Penninx et al. 1995). (Dutch) women have profited most from these measures, and in Amsterdam this was especially the case in trade, the hotel (and catering) industry (Kloosterman 1994, 1996a and 1996b). On top of all this, the government has developed a series of employment plans, training schemes, subsidised wage-schemes, contracts, positive action measures and so on. Immigrants from non-industrial countries, especially from Suriname, are over-represented in the various job creation programmes in the public sector. They constitute an average 43 per cent of the participants, while being ‘only’ 26 per cent of the labour force. Furthermore, immigrants often find employment in areas of the public sector which are explicitly orientated to ethnic minorities as a target group. For example, so-called migrant workers in the welfare sector, teachers of mother tongue education or civil servants concerned

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7 This applies to immigrants and their children from the ex-colonies, Mediterranean countries and all other non-industrial countries. In the jargon of the Amsterdam civil servant these are collectively named, ‘minorities’.

8 At the end of December 1996 these programmes totalled 6,492 participants, of which 2,799 were from the above mentioned target groups. See the Amsterdam Work Monitor (1996: 10). The share of ethnic minoritiess in the Melkert 1 Supervision Programme is a good 60%. According to Hoolt and Scholten (1996: 73-75) Surinamese and Moroccans were the main participants in the JWG. See also Smeets 1993: 16-17.
with the implementation of the ethnic minority policy (Bovenkerk, den Brok and Ruland 1991; Koot and Uniken Venema 1985).

This gravitating of immigrants towards the public sector is interesting. Waldinger had already emphasised the importance of this sector in New York and Los Angeles for African-Americans. Previously the civil rights movement had fought for the privileged admittance of African-Americans to (among others) civil servant positions, a situation which, due to their political empowering, they could exploit to the full. Once inside the civil service they could use their own networks to assist other African-Americans to find better jobs. In this way they nestled themselves in the public sector niche. It is difficult to say whether we are already witnessing similar developments in Amsterdam. In the Netherlands this sector includes a mix of the most diverse services and establishments from both the civil service (in the strict sense of the word) and the subsidised sector such as education, welfare work and health care. The use of the concept ‘niche’ in this vast and colourful field of institutions seems at present inappropriate. The supplementary employment programmes – to restrict ourselves to this field – offer employment for only a short duration and are furthermore (officially) not intended for one specific ethnic group. Having said this, experience in Amsterdam shows that people from Surinam or the Antilles work as government officials or in the field of education almost as often as Dutch natives (Berdowski 1994: 40). What has not yet materialised, still can. The fact that the Surinamese have not as yet been able to get to grips with the political system in order to influence the division of labour – assuming that they would wish to do this – hampers the possible formation of their own niche within certain public functions or sectors.

An increasing number of immigrants no longer wait for a job as an employee, but as the Jews or Roman Catholic Westphalians before them, set up their own business. Some of them had already emigrated with the intention of becoming an entrepreneur in the host country (Blom and Romeijn 1981; Bovenkerk and Ruland 1992; Choenni 1997). In this

9 This niche has proven vulnerable. Both in New York and Los Angeles African-Americans are losing political influence, while the continuation of programmes for affirmative action is under discussion. Concentration on networks in this sector has led to a lack of relevant networks in other ones. This is now leading to their downfall. See Waldinger (1996) and Grant, Oliver and James (1996: 399-400).

10 This does not however alter the fact that they may profit more than other immigrant categories from the space afforded to immigrants within the political system or that they may be better equipped to fight for this space. Compare Rath (1988: 631) or consider the adventures of the so-called Black Caucus (Zwart Beraad) in the district of the Bijlmer.
On the first of January 1996, Amsterdam counted roughly 72,000 businesses (Amsterdam in Cijfers 1996: 207-211). Exactly how many of these belong to immigrants is difficult to say. In 1986 it was assumed that about 1,000 immigrant entrepreneurs were in business out of a total of 30,000 entrepreneurs; that was about five per cent (Kupers 1995). In 1993 Choenni (1993: 58-59) researched the Company Trade Register at the Chamber of Commerce and counted 4301 immigrant-run businesses. According to the Register, 5097 entrepreneurs were involved in these establishments and they accounted for 6.7 per cent of the total population. However, registration at the Chamber of Commerce is imperfect: not all registered businesses actually start up, while not all those which close down are registered as such. A recently held (mini) count of the labour-force (AKT) showed the number of self-employed entrepreneurs in the city to be smaller (Hoolt and Scholten 1996: 76-77). Of the 3328 entrepreneurs counted by Choenni from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles, Aruba and the Mediterranean countries, the AKT does not come further than 2600: roughly four per cent of the total. The economic relevance stretches further than the interests of the entrepreneur. The Bureau for Economic Argumentation (1994) claims – without proof – that each ethnic entrepreneur has three employees. If this assumption is correct, this would mean that immigrant businesses in Amsterdam contribute to employment an additional 8,000 or even 10,000 jobs.

The Turks are the largest category of immigrant entrepreneurs, followed directly by Surinamese and less closely by Moroccans, Egyptians and Pakistanis. Together they account for almost two-thirds of the registered immigrant entrepreneurs (see table 3). If we study the number of entrepreneurs in the respective labour forces, we see that Italians and Turks, and especially Egyptians, Pakistanis and Indians are active: their entrepreneurship far exceeds the national average of 8,7 per cent (OECD 1995: 314-315).

Table 4 shows the sectors in which immigrants most often settle, and it is here that we should find the contours of their niches. Indeed, there does appear to be some kind of ethnic specialisation forming.
As shown in the table, of all the researched categories, Surinamese and Turkish entrepreneurs are the most widely spread over the different sectors. Turks are the only category to be active in manufacturing industry, in particular in the garment industry – as far as this still exists today (Rath 1998b; Raes 1996). Besides the latter, Turks are active in the catering industry, in particular in their own coffee houses and in (Italian) restaurants (Larsen 1995; Rekers 1993), and in (Islamic) butchers and bakeries (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath 1997b: 74-85). Recently, there has been a movement towards trading activities (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath 1997a) although this is without clear traces of concentration.

Surinamese, the other immigrant group spread widely over the different sectors, has also penetrated the service sector in such branches as insurance and property. They are most active in the distribution of advertising material (folders), in accountancy, in boosting trade and in assisting during events in the fields of sport and theatre, without traces of niche formation however. In the rest of the service sector we come across Surinamese who have set themselves up in business as driving instructors, cleaners or as handyman/woman.

Other remarkable concentrations of immigrant entrepreneurs are of course the Italians in their ice-cream parlours; the Chinese in their stores and restaurants; the Greeks in their restaurants; Indians and Pakistanis in the (wholesale) trade in textiles and clothing and Egyptians in (shoarma) snack bars, currency exchange banks and teleshops.

This overview also shows that quite a number of immigrants set up shop without niches being formed, and that some ‘older’ niches have either almost or totally disappeared. In certain cases this was caused by the disappearance of the occupation or branch of industry, such as the straw-hat makers. In other instances this was due to the location of the activities being changed. The diamond industry in Amsterdam – an outstanding example of the Jewish niche – has almost disappeared; before the Second World War businesses were already being moved to Antwerp or elsewhere. The baking trade, in the nineteenth century a niche for immigrants of German origin (Schrover 1996: 103) still exists to this day, albeit with strong industrial influence and no longer in the hands of one specific group. Although one in six bakers in Amsterdam are Turkish, they represent a minute segment of the market (Kloosterman, van der Leun and Rath 1997b: 74-85).

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11 Indo-Chinese are generally strongly represented in the medical profession, whether this is the case in Amsterdam I cannot say (compare The 1989).
The market trade, previously the domain of Jewish entrepreneurs, has not (yet?) developed into a niche for immigrant groups. The strict system of assigning market stalls according to registration based on the subscription period, seems to systematically disadvantage immigrants (Kupers 1995; compare Kehla, Engbersen and Snel 1997: 54-55). Finally, it is noticeable that there are next-to-no immigrants active in the street-trade, such as the Jewish paupers or the Chinese peanut sellers before the war (van Heek 1936).

A few exceptions are perhaps Vietnamese pancake roll sellers, Italian ice-cream sellers, musicians from Ecuador or the (undocumented) Indian rose sellers (Staring 1998), which is not to say that these *per se* form niches. The small number of hawkers could be explained by the – by now – fairly strict regulations on ambulant trading, by changed consumption patterns, or by the fact that it is not longer necessary today to earn a pittance by trading door-to-door. The present welfare state guarantees social security: each (legal) resident has a right to an income, either from supplementary benefits or otherwise (which is not to say that people never have financial problems). This is very different in ‘liberal welfare states’ such as in the United States.

**Ethnic Succession**

In as much as immigrants today form niches, to what extent are they part of a historic chain, as Waldinger claims. In the *interbellum*, Italian ice-cream makers forced Jewish ice-cream sellers from the market; more recently, Egyptians have outdone Israeli *shoarma* sellers and Turks have nestled in what was previously the Jewish niche in the garment industry. Ethnic succession also takes place in the more infamous sectors of the economy. Moroccan cannabis dealers, for example, have pushed Dutch *drugslords* out of the market (Bovenkerk and Fijnaut 1996: 129).

However, these examples do not in the least prove that the settlement of immigrant entrepreneurs takes place according to the rules of Waldinger’s game of ethnic musical chairs. At second glance, the case seems somewhat more complicated.

Take, for example, the Italian *ice-cream makers* (Bovenkerk, Eijken and Bovenkerk-Teerink 1984). These young migrants prepared excellent fruit ice, a product which was appreciated by many customers. On the basis of this popular product and with

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12 It is no coincidence that one often finds hawkers in the *global cities* such as New York or Los Angeles (compare Austin 1994).
the help of their own networks, they were able to form a niche. Although Italians are still well represented in the ice trade, the continuity of their niche is in jeopardy. The second – and later – generations of *gelatieri* are not inclined to take over their parent’s business and move out into other economic sectors. Nowadays, community forming hardly exists and the role of ethnic networks has correspondingly decreased (compare Lindo 1994). Moreover, the preparation and selling of quality ice faces competition from other (internationally operating) factories such as Häagen Dasz or concerns such as Unilever. During the 1960s, Italian guest workers did make a run at the ice-cream selling business (as street-traders). So much so that the local authorities started to regulate the branch. They thus enforced a legal ceiling, limiting the growth in the number of entrepreneurs in the ice trade. However, the majority of ice-cream sellers has no ambition to establish itself as a self-employed ice-cream maker – among other things due to the many rules and regulations to which the self-employed ice specialist must comply – and considers its trade only as an extra source of income.

Take as another example the *Turkish garment manufacturers* (Raes 1996; Rath 1998b). When, during the years of recovery after the war, the garment industry struggled to its feet, various Jewish entrepreneurs participated. They did so, however, without reinstalling their niche. Jewish entrepreneurs could no longer rely on the help of Jewish girls for the workshop and instead they recruited labour on the Dutch open market and later also in the Mediterranean countries. The sector began to decline during the 1960s, due to international competition, and one business after another closed, or moved its clothing assembly to lower-wage countries. A few Turkish workers who had learnt the trade from Jewish entrepreneurs, eventually set up their own establishments. These entrepreneurs only really got started once market developments were favourable. Partly as a result of changing consumer demands, customers – especially those in the so-called short-cycle ladies fashion – needed shorter and faster supply lines. Local workshops could meet this demand. Both immigrants with experience in the (craft) clothing industry in Turkey and unemployed guest workers got lucky, and, partly through their networks, a cluster of Turkish trade and industry evolved. The mushrooming of the Turkish garment industry at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s is also linked with the extremely accommodating attitude of the authorities towards their informal practices. Since 1994 however, the Public Prosecutor has intensified controls on fraud and illegalities in the garment industry. Partly forced by the operations of the Intervention Team for the Garment Industry (CIT) and partly due to the opening of new markets in
In East Europe and Turkey, garment sweatshops were forced to close, one after another. As far as the Turkish niche has disappeared, no new successors have appeared to take their place as yet.

Or take the Egyptian shoarma sellers (Choenni 1997: 71-79). Shoarma (kebab) was introduced to Amsterdam during the seventies by Israelis. During the busy holiday periods they hired Coptic student workers from Egypt who knew the product. When the snack became popular, these first temporary workers changed tack and became self-employed entrepreneurs. From one thing comes another, and in a few years Egyptian immigrants have completely overshadowed the Israeli shoarma sellers. In 1993, in a ‘community’ of roughly 3200 Egyptians, some 145 snack bars and lunchrooms were counted. The rise of these shoarma bars was so quick that the question arises whether this falls under the heading ‘ethnic musical chairs’. After all, the Israelis had hardly had a chance to form their own niche.

**Conclusion**

Time now to make up the balance. The immigrants who, over the years have come to Amsterdam, have all followed their own route of economic incorporation. In earlier historic periods, immigrants mostly sought refuge in trade or in certain traditional craft industries. This was because their skills and trading contacts were aimed at these sectors, but also because they had been denied access to other more regular economic areas. In more recent periods, the majority of immigrants have taken their refuge first and foremost as employees. Lately, however, self-employed entrepreneurship is on the rise, a development in which immigrants participate disproportionally. Here Amsterdam shows an increasing similarity with the world’s most classic immigrant city, New York. Within groups of immigrants we sometimes see a large degree of heterogeneity, though.

The sociologist Waldinger, has discovered in New York – and also in Los Angeles – an remarkable pattern of economic incorporation: immigrants settle in niches, and become – via these niches – engaged in what resembles a game of ethnic musical chairs. Further examination, however, shows that this pattern of incorporation is not automatically applicable to Amsterdam. There are forms of ethnic concentration, but these do not seem to be the only – or necessary – route to economic incorporation.
Moreover, there is not always a continuing historic chain: sometimes niche succession takes place falteringly, other times, not at all.

Although the present state of research in Amsterdam demands modesty, the above economic sociological exercise still leads to questions regarding Waldinger’s theoretical assumptions. Waldinger does point to important factors and processes, such as the role of social networks, but fails to take the following points adequately into consideration.

Firstly, Waldinger stipulates the necessity of the existence of a hierarchy of preferred population categories. This must, moreover, be practically adequate: for example by the formation of a labour queue. Generally speaking, such processes also take place in the Netherlands. To be more specific however, there are important differences – for we are now talking about different ‘imagined communities’ (compare Rath 1991). In the United States, ethnic and racial characteristics form important markers, – it is no coincidence that Waldinger calls the society ‘race conscious’ - while in the past in the Netherlands it was mainly religious, and at present especially socio-cultural characteristics which constitute the main markers. In the present Dutch system, the signification of socio-cultural characteristics inspires all kinds of attempts at the ‘controlled integration’ of minority groups; attempts which assume that social-cultural characteristics are changeable and which often have an extremely paternalistic nature. This specific signification and its socio-political dynamics produce changing orders of ranking and queues. This means that attention should be paid to their dynamics, that is the possibility that the appreciation of society for these characteristics can rise or fall. Although only 30 years ago, Spanish and Italian immigrants in the Netherlands figured as problem categories at the back of the queue (although not as far back as the ‘long-haired gouts’, see Bagley 1973), they are now considered as ‘relatively non-problematical’ (Lindo 1994: 117).

Secondly, and somewhat related, Waldinger supposes the long-term existence of more or less cohesive ethnic groups, with a large measure of solidarity and trust. However, in reality, the social relationships are not often that harmonious. Especially when entrepreneurs are operating from one niche, that is in the same market, there is a strong chance that they become each other’s competitors. This can undermine the niche. Furthermore, we must take into consideration that some immigrant groups assimilate and that their niches are not per se permanent. Italian immigrants, for example, are using their own ethnic networks increasingly less for their economic activities.
Thirdly, Waldinger focuses on the sociological and not on the economic field when explaining the economic incorporation process. Although he certainly does take market developments into consideration – he sees these as one of the factors which leads to changes in the labour queue – he sees networks as being of central importance for the incorporation process. However, if we are to explain the rise and fall of the Turkish garment industry in Amsterdam, for example, we cannot ignore such factors as the changes in consumer demand or the international division of labour. Without such changes, the small Turkish businesses would never had so much opportunity to develop. In this connection, we must also point out the role of technological change. The fall of the Jewish niche in the sugar trade and industry, half-way through the nineteenth century, can be explained, for the most part, by the technological innovations which made it possible to make sugar from sugar beet instead of from imported sugar cane. Although the Jews had not lost their control over the processing of sugar beet, the Roman Catholics from the southern province of Brabant were able to take over the market simply because they were able to offer a considerably cheaper product (Schrover 1994: 164).

Fourthly, Waldinger seems to limit the role of the institutional framework to political arrangements steered by ethnic or racially based interest groups with the aim of influencing the allocation of jobs in the public sector. The political system in New York is certainly not a blueprint for ‘the’ institutional framework. The latter is determined by the government and its nimbus of quango’s, ‘quasi non-governmental organisations’. In the Dutch corporate welfare state, this framework has expanded enormously, certainly in comparison with the rather meagre American welfare state. This has far-reaching consequences for spending power, for example. Even the long-term unemployed have a fairly high minimum-wage in the Netherlands, which influences the necessity of starting-up and making a success of one’s own business (Kloosterman 1998). The mixture of rules and regulations steering economic traffic – and the way these are enforced by the authorities – have more direct influence. The Jewish street-trade before the Second World War, the preparation of ice and ice-selling by Italians as well as the Turkish garment manufacture would have developed to a greater extent if regulations had been less strict and the investigators less active. On the other hand, we see that the institutional framework can contribute to the endurance of certain niches. The establishment of Islamic butchers (of Turkish or Moroccan origin) is subjected to a special legal regime. Moreover, the ritual slaughter necessary for obtaining halâl meat, falls under a different
regulation. Interestingly, this regulation is based on the rules and regulations which were once made for Jewish butchers (Rath et al. 1997: 74).

All in all, the game of ethnic musical chairs, described by Waldinger, cannot be accepted without reservation as the model for understanding and explaining the incorporation of immigrants in Amsterdam. Although he points to a number of important processes – something which deserves our appreciation – others remain underexposed. His viewpoint would certainly be strengthened if he were to give more credit to the role of the market and to technological innovations and the institutional framework •


Table 1 Immigrant/ethnic groups in Amsterdam, 1st January 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>69,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>31,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South European countries</td>
<td>16,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Industrialised countries</td>
<td>59,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialised countries</td>
<td>69,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>413,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>718,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hoot and Scholten 1996: 15.*
### Table 2 Percentages of unemployed people in Amsterdam, 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Percentage unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surinam</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Antilles</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South European countries</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-industrialised countries</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialised countries</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Surinam</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>1.015</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in labour (%)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>&gt;33</td>
<td>&gt;33</td>
<td>&gt;33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 4 Immigrant enterprises in 1993 in Amsterdam by sector and country of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Surinm</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakist</th>
<th>Other immigr</th>
<th>Total immigr</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale/</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distributive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trades</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail business</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1.290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>4.301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>